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Three new structural factors underlie the most recent global crisis: 
(i) the fact that several high-population countries have joined the growth 
process; (ii) the increasing scarcity of environmental and certain natural 
resources; and (iii) the extraordinary concentration of income and wealth 
that has occurred in the advanced economies over the last two decades. 
These structural changes have significantly strengthened the links between 
global growth and commodity demand; they have made world commodity 
supply increasingly inelastic, and have rendered economic growth more 
dependent on easy monetary and financial policies. The combination of 
these factors could make the world economy highly crisis-prone and may 
hinder recovery from the current one. 
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This article focuses on new structural factors that 
have played an important but often neglected role in 
the genesis of the current global crisis, and may also 
have profound implications for long-term economic 
growth. It examines the synergetic interactions that 
exist between three structural factors: (i) the awakening 
of heavily populated countries, such as China and 
India, from centuries of economic lethargy, and their 
emergence as world growth leaders, and as large-
scale providers of industrial goods and consumers 
of  commodities; (ii) the increasing scarcity of 
environmental and certain natural resources which, 
for the first time ever, is starting to be felt in rich and 
poor countries alike; (iii) the dramatic concentration 
of wealth that has occurred over the last two decades 
especially in the advanced economies. 
Structural factors (i) and (ii) have made commodity 
prices highly responsive to economic growth. The 
increased economic weight of population giants that 
are still at an early stage of development, such as 
China, India and others, has increased the commodity- 
and energy-intensity of global economic growth, as 
growth in these countries is largely based on a rapid 
expansion of  commodity- and energy-intensive 
industries (Farrell and Grant, 2005). Moreover, while 
the advanced economies have largely dematerialized 
their production by focusing more and more on 
services and knowledge-intensive industries, their 
consumption has not dematerialized by nearly as 
much. This asymmetry has meant that the advanced 
countries increasingly rely on the rest of the world to 
meet their growing net demand for material goods, 
energy and other commodities.
As a result of the second factor —the increasing 
worldwide scarcity of natural resources— the response 
capacity of commodity supply is becoming less and 
less flexible, at a time when world growth is fuelling 
higher commodity demand. As a result, rapid world 
economic growth is now closely accompanied by 
rising commodity prices. 
  Research assistance was provided by Asif  Islam and Amparo 
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Central banks respond to these prices hikes 
by tightening monetary policy to prevent the 
corresponding pressures being validated in higher 
inflation indices, while hopefully still leaving some 
room for the economy to continue growing, albeit 
perhaps at a more modest pace. Nonetheless, for 
reasons to be made clear below, the third structural 
factor —the increasing concentration of wealt— has 
made the real economy much more sensitive to tight 
monetary and financial policies than in the past, and 
this has considerably reduced the space available 
for continued economic growth in periods of tight 
monetary policy.
Over the last two decades, the concentration 
of  wealth in advanced economies, and in many 
middle-income countries too, has gone hand-in-hand 
with stagnation among the middle class; and both 
phenomena are at least partly the result of new policies 
implemented in this period (Krugman, 2006). This 
suffocation of the middle class —what Paul Krugman 
has dubbed “the great wealth transfer”— has made 
the vast majority of households increasingly reliant on 
new borrowing to finance their consumption, thereby 
causing debt-to-income ratios to explode (Taylor 
and others, 2008). As a large portion of that debt is 
often subject to periodic interest-rate adjustments, 
household disposable income (after debt service) has 
become much more sensitive to interest-rate hikes. 
Moreover, as global economic expansion depends 
heavily on rapid consumption growth, especially in 
the United States and other advanced countries, this 
has made economic growth ever more reliant on easier 
monetary and financial policies in those countries. 
Such policies are essential to allow consumers easy 
access to credit and support a relatively low debt-
service burden despite their higher household debt/
income ratios. As result, middle-class households were 
for long able to increase their consumption, financed 
by higher debt levels, even though their real income 
were being squeezed or remained flat. 
In the United States, the share of total household 
income received by the richest 10% of households grew 
continuously from about 35% in the 1980s to 50% in 
2007, its highest level ever (Saez, 2009). Ominously, 
the only other period in the last century in which the 
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was in the years leading up to the Great Depression. In 
fact, in 1917-28 the share of the top 10% grew almost 
exactly as fast as in 1996-2007, rising from 40% to 49% 
in the earlier period and from 40% to 50% in the latter 
(Picketty and Saez, 2003). Apparently, this is more 
than mere coincidence; when income concentration 
reaches such extreme levels it makes economies that 
depend on domestic demand increasingly vulnerable 
to deep and prolonged crises, because it becomes 
increasingly difficult to keep demand growing. While 
domestic income concentration may not directly make 
economies where growth is primarily export-led, 
such as those of Latin America, more crisis-prone, 
it certainly does in countries such as the United 
States that rely on domestic demand. Moreover, as 
this and a number of other rich countries provide a 
large proportion of the rest of the world’s markets, 
a demand slump in these countries could easily drag 
the world into recession.1 
As shown below, the greater sensitivity of 
commodity prices to world economic growth, combined 
with the greater reliance of  economic growth on 
1  In most countries with open markets, such as those of Latin 
America, China, India and many others, wealth concentration 
may not be a direct obstacle, since economic growth is mostly 
fuelled by foreign demand. This causes a social “tragedy of the 
commons” type of syndrome: governments that tend to be driven 
almost exclusively by gdp growth-maximization objectives have 
no incentive to prevent a concentration of wealth, since this will 
not affect an individual country’s growth potential. Nonetheless, 
if  most countries in a globalized world apply the same pro-growth 
policies with no concern for the distribution of wealth, wealth 
concentration will become contagious across the world. This, 
in turn, restricts global demand and thus provides a precarious 
foundation for sustained global economic growth.
loose monetary policies in the advanced countries, 
are likely to make rapid economic growth with price 
stability much harder to sustain in the future; and 
they may make it more difficult to recover from the 
current crisis. 
Section II of this article makes a detailed analysis 
of the emergence of the recent great recession, against 
the backdrop of a new economic order generated by the 
three structural factors mentioned above. The analysis 
starts by reviewing interactions between rich and poor 
countries, highlighting how the economic success 
achieved by many highly populated but historically 
poor countries has made global economic growth 
more widespread. Section III reviews environmental 
aspects and their relevance for global economic growth. 
Section IV considers the consequences of the radical 
new policies implemented by various conservative 
governments, based on the intellectual laissez-faire 
ideology reinvented in the advanced economies, to 
which many middle-income countries around the 
world have signed up. One result of  these policies 
was greater concentration of wealth in most countries 
(Jerzmanowski and Nabar, 2008; Philippon and 
Reshef, 2009). Thus, while economic growth across 
countries has become more inclusive, with the growth 
club expanding to encompass a number of previously 
excluded countries, income growth within individual 
economies has increasingly become the privilege of 
a relatively small minority. Section V describes the 
relationship between energy and raw materials prices, 
inflation, and the outbreak of the crisis. Lastly, section 
VI concludes by showing how the unusual nature and 
intensity of the current crisis have been the corollary 
to these developments. 
II
The new economic order: retrospect
1. The dematerialization of production 
in the North 
For much of  the twentieth century, continuous 
economic growth was the privilege of an exclusive 
club comprising no more than a fifth of the world’s 
population (henceforth referred to as the “North”). As 
the North grew ever richer, it underwent continuous 
structural change, and its production became 
increasingly “dematerialized” (López and Stocking, 
2009). The structure of gross domestic product (gdp) 
in the North became increasingly focused on services 
and, generally, on human-capital- and knowledge-
dependent activities. As a counterpart, the total-
output share of natural-resource-based activities, and 
later most manufacturing sectors, gradually shrank. 
Figure 1 illustrates the intensity of this process over 
the last 50 years in the United States, as the shares 
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of both commodity production and manufacturing 
in total gdp have steadily declined. Manufacturing, 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, oil extraction and mining 
have seen their combined gdp share plummet from 
over 40% in the early 1950s to less than 20% in the 
early 2000s. 
This dematerialization of the North’s production 
has not been matched by a similar dematerialization 
of consumption. While there was some shift in the 
structure of consumption —which ceased to be centred 
on commodities such as foodstuffs— consumers in 
the North continued to expand their demand for 
energy and industrial products, especially durable 
goods, at a rate that often outpaced their per capita 
income (Ghertner and Fripp, 2007). The North’s 
consumption dematerialized much more slowly than 
its domestic production, making it increasingly reliant 
on the rest of  the world (the “South”) to supply, 
firstly, commodities (including energy and other 
raw materials), and then manufacturing goods too, 
particularly over the last three decades. 
An analysis of trade flows in the United States, 
for example, shows a rapid increase in net imports of 
commodities and industrial goods as a proportion 
of that country’s total imports and gdp. Figure 2 
illustrates this, showing a steep rise in the share of 
industrial goods in total imports and large increases 
in imports of  manufactured and other industrial 
goods as a proportion of domestic production. The 
same is true for most other commodities including 
metals (see figure 3). Imports of  industrial goods 
and commodities have grown particularly fast over 
the last two decades.
2. The roles played by the South 
This article distinguishes two groups of economies 
in the South: those that are rich in natural resources 
(most of  Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and 
parts of Asia); and those that are labour-abundant 
(nearly all Asian countries). The labour-abundant 
South includes population giants such as China and 
India and a few others, which are home to a very 
large proportion of the world’s total population; in 
contrast, the resource-rich part of the South is relatively 
sparsely populated. While there have been periods in 
which the South as a whole has been able to achieve 
modest growth, until the last three or four decades 
few countries in the South had been unable to sustain 
growth for lengthy periods of time. The resource-rich 
South essentially became a passive supplier of energy 
and other commodities to the North. 
Since colonial times the North has maintained 
efficient commodity-producing enclaves in the 
resource-rich part of  the South, selling almost 
exclusively to northern markets. Burgeoning demand 
FIGURE 1
United States: sector composition of gdp, 1947-2007 
(Percentages of total gdp)
Source: United States Bureau of  Economic Analysis.
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FIGURE 2
United States: share of industrial imports in total imports and gdp,a 1972-2008
(Percentages)
Source: United States Bureau of  Economic Analysis; R.C. Feenstra, J. Romalis and P. Schott, “United States imports, exports and 
tariff  data, 1989-2001”, NBER Working Paper, No. 9387, Cambridge, Massachusetts, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001), 
http://www.internationaldata.org/.
a The categories are: fuel and lubricants, paper and paper base stocks, materials associated with non-durables, selected construction 
materials, unfinished and finished metals associated with durable goods, non-metals associated with durables.
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FIGURE 3
United States: metal imports as a proportion of domestic production, 1900-2004
(Percentages)
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for commodities in these markets was matched by 
continuous exploration and new investments made 
by the North to expand these enclave economies. 
The presence of  abundant resources in the South 
and the absence of effective regulations limiting the 
environmental damage caused by their extraction, 
together with continuous Northern investments in 
resource extraction in the (resource-rich) South, kept 
the global commodity supply curve relatively flat 
for a long time (in other words, supply was highly 
elastic), which helped to keep real commodity prices 
constant (López and Stocking, 2009). As has been 
documented in several studies, productive enclaves of 
this type have had few linkages with the rest of the 
South’s economies, and generally contributed little 
to their growth (de Janvry, 1975). 
Both the resource-rich and the labour-abundant 
segments of the South remained essentially stagnant, 
exerting little pressure on commodity demand; and 
this, in turn, helped to keep commodity prices stable. 
The fact that this process lasted well into the second 
half of the twentieth century (Sokoloff and Engerman, 
2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Khor, 
2000) allowed the North to grow while enjoying the 
luxury of commodity prices that stayed constant and 
sometimes even fell in real terms, despite continuously 
expanding demand from the North throughout much 
of the century (see figure 4). 
3. The labour-abundant South emerges in the 
global economy
As documented by the so-called “resource-curse” 
literature, the constant expansion of natural resource 
extraction in enclaves of  resource-rich countries 
of the South has in most cases been insufficient to 
promote their sustained economic growth (Barbier, 
2005). In contrast, the labour-abundant South was 
better placed to benefit from the growing demand for 
industrial goods arising from the dematerialization 
of production in the North, especially over the last 
three decades. 
(a) First, the “Little Giants”
The labour-abundant South started to shake off  
its lethargy in the 1970s with the emergence of a few 
relatively small countries in South East Asia (Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong-Kong (Special Administrative Region 
of China), Singapore and a number of others), which 
succeeded in maintaining rapid growth over long periods 
FIGURE 4
real commodity price trends: producer price index (ppi),a
all commodities, 1913-2007
Source: United States Bureau of  Labor Statistics.
a Producer price index for commodities as defined by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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of time, driven by manufacturing exports. Although 
small in size, these newly industrializing countries 
(nics) became major exporters of  manufactured 
goods to the North. The emergence of these little 
manufacturing-export giants allowed the North to 
intensify its relative specialization in environmentally 
clean non-material products, while relying increasingly 
on the nics as efficient suppliers of industrial goods 
to satisfy growing demand among consumers in the 
North (Krugman, 1994; Lall and Albaladejo, 2004; 
Noland, 1997). 
Although population density in the nics was 
high, their overall population was too small to have a 
significant impact on global demand for commodities, 
despite their rapid growth. This meant that nic 
expansion did not exert greater demand pressure on 
world commodity prices, which, as shown in figure 4, 
remained broadly stable during the nic boom period 
in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Thus, by the late 1980s the world had achieved 
a remarkable equilibrium: the North plus a few nics 
achieved rapid growth —the North on the basis of 
environmentally clean service-oriented production 
which greatly facilitated its low-cost, ecologically 
“sustainable” development; while the nics supplied 
the North with an increasing portion of its growing 
net demand for industrial goods at low market prices, 
albeit produced at high domestic environmental cost; 
whereas the still slow-growing resource-rich part of 
the South supplied raw materials, also at low prices 
but at the cost of a continuous erosion of its natural 
resources and environment.2 
(b) Then, the “Real Giants”
The late 1980s brought even more dramatic 
changes, as other large labour-abundant countries 
of the South implemented major pro-growth policy 
reforms. The emergence of the new industrial giants 
2  It is interesting to note that the North started to dramatically 
reverse its environmental degradation in the mid-1970s, just as 
the nics were emerging as suppliers of low-cost goods produced 
by polluting industries. This process also coincides with the time 
when most of the modern environmental regulation in the North 
begun to be implemented. Increasingly stringent environmental 
regulation in the North may have been rendered politically acceptable 
precisely because of the emergence of foreign suppliers of goods 
produced by polluting industries. López (2008) shows that one of the 
reasons why the North is able to enforce significant environmental 
regulation at very low cost (estimated at less than 2% of gdp) is the 
emergence of the nics, and later of other large industrial suppliers, 
which allowed it to shift its production away from most polluting 
industries. This view is consistent with the econometric evidence 
provided by Levinson and Taylor (2008).
(nigs), mainly China, India and a few other large 
initially poor countries that succeeded in growing 
very rapidly, was partly a consequence of the drastic 
policy reforms implemented in those countries. The 
new policies included pro-market reforms, privatization 
of State-owned enterprises, export promotion through 
exchange-rate policies and other incentives, and weak 
regulation of pollution, which effectively gave a green 
light to expand manufacturing production with few 
environmental constraints. The success of these new 
policies was assured by the burgeoning demand for 
industrial goods among consumers in the North. 
The nigs were as efficient as the nics in supplying 
industrial goods, but on a much larger scale (Bosworth 
and Collins, 2008; Panagariya, 2006; López, 2008; Lall 
and Albaladejo, 2004); and industrial-export-led growth 
has afforded them unprecedented economic growth 
for over two decades. Growth in these countries was 
based on the rapid expansion of industrial exports, 
facilitated by undervalued exchange rates.3 This, in turn, 
meant a huge accumulation of foreign exchange (see 
figure 5) which was recycled to the North, especially the 
United Sates and parts of Europe, thus creating large 
current-account deficits in the respective economies.4 
Copious financial flows into the North helped keep 
interest rates low and massively expanded the supply 
of credit in those countries, while the capital flow from 
the nigs and oil-exporting countries to the North 
fuelled a continuous rise in equity and real-estate 
prices, which prolonged the economic boom and 
helped form a financial bubble. This, in turn, further 
fed the North’s huge appetite for industrial imports 
from the emerging giants. 
Another remarkable (temporary) equilibrium was 
thus created: the massive financial flows from the new 
giants, created by their industrial-export success, fuelled 
the boom in the North which, in turn, fed consumer 
demand for industrial imports and thus reinforced the 
nigs’ continuous expansion. Real gdp growth rates 
of China and India over the last two decades have 
been consistently above 8% per year, more than three 
times the rates achieved by the advanced economies 
3  According to Rodrik (2007), not only have China and India kept 
their exchange rates undervalued over the last two decades, but the 
extent of undervaluation has increased steadily during the period. 
Most of the nics also based their industrial export take-off  on 
undervalued exchange rates, although, unlike the nigs, some of 
them recently have allowed their real exchange rates to become 
less undervalued —even overvalued at times.
4  The exceptions were Germany and Japan, both of which are large 
exporters of technologically advanced goods and services. 
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(imf  World Economic Outlook). More importantly, 
the nigs contributed over US$ 350 billion per year 
to global growth in the early 2000s —that is, over a 
third of the total annual growth of the world economy, 
estimated at about US$ 1.1 trillion. As shown in 
table 1, the contribution made by China and India, 
of  about US$ 200 billion, represented nearly 20% 
of  total annual world growth in the 2000-07 period, 
compared to just 5% in the 1980s.
4. Finally, commodity-demand pressures 
The new North-nig boom equilibrium of the second 
half  of  the 1990s and early 2000s differed in one 
important respect from the North-nic equilibrium 
of earlier decades: nearly 50% of  all humanity lives 
in the “new giants”, compared to at most 5% who live 
in the “little giants”. In other words, the emergence 
of the nigs dramatically expanded the growth club, 
FIGURE 5
China and india: foreign exchange reserves, 1990-2008 
(Billions of dollars)





















































distribution of real global gdp growth by region and period
(Millions of dollars)
Period China and India Advanced Economies Rest of  the World World
1961-1969 5 154 366 333 120 100 491 587
1970-1979 12 198 514 740 47 150 574 088
1980-1989 36 740 472 160 94 735 603 635
1990-1999 86 310 519 200 116 040 721 550
2000-2007 201 375 618 875 274 525 1 094 775
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
35
GLoBAL EConoMIC CRIsEs, EnVIRonMEntAL-REsouRCE sCARCIty AnD WEALth ConCEntRAtIon  •  RAMón LóPEz
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 2  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 0
and, for the first time ever, a large part of the South 
(most of  the labour-abundant portion) became 
an increasingly important and rapidly growing 
net consumer of  energy, raw materials and other 
commodities. Constant economic growth ceased 
to be the exclusive preserve of just a few countries; 
now, for the first time in history, most the world’s 
population were living in countries that were capable 
of growing. Only the resource-rich South remained 
more or less at a standstill.
The nigs’ recent leadership of world economic 
expansion has made growth much more commodity- 
and energy- intensive than in previous decades, 
when it was mainly confined to the North. This is a 
consequence of the large increase in the absolute scale 
of economic growth caused by the incorporation of 
50% of  the world’s population, formerly dormant, 
into the growth process. Moreover, the fact that the 
massive population of the now expanding nigs still 
has a low per capita income means that their income-
elasticity for food, energy and other commodities 
is much higher than in the advanced economies. In 
other words, the continuous upward shift of the world 
commodity demand curve caused by income growth 
is now occurring much faster than before. 
The rapid growth of the nigs thus generated not 
only a drastic expansion of the supply of industrial 
goods but also a dramatic increase in the nigs’ demand 
for energy, food, and other commodities. As the nigs 
started from very low levels of consumption, their 
increased demand for such commodities initially had 
little repercussion on world markets. By the mid-1990s, 
however, they had become significant net importers of 
commodities, energy, and other raw materials. After 
more than a decade of annual growth of 8-10%, the 
huge populations of the nigs expanded their demand 
for commodities to account for a sizable portion of 
total world demand, and so it remains today. Figures 6 
and 7 illustrate the rapid rise of consumption levels 
in China and India and their shares of total world 
consumption of energy and certain other commodities 
over the last two decades.
FIGURE 6
China and india: Energy consumption and share in 
world consumption, 1980-2006
(Trillions of btu)
Source: United States Energy Information Administration (eia).
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As a result of the incorporation of the nigs into the 
growth process, the relation between commodity 
demand and economic growth is becoming ever closer. 
At the same time, the natural resources that the South 
used to possess in large quantities, are becoming 
less abundant, and governments are finally starting 
to take seriously some of  the dire environmental 
consequences of the frenetic expansion of natural 
resource extraction. While most underground raw 
materials may still be plentiful, there are signs that their 
supply will have to tap increasingly more expensive 
sources; moreover, resource extraction has led to 
massive environmental costs affecting extremely 
valuable ecosystems, water quality, forests and other 
increasingly scarce environmental assets.5 
5  With some important exceptions, the real limits on commodity 
supply are not so much the scarcity of in-ground raw materials, 
but the high and rising environmental costs that their production 
entails (Simpson, Toman and Ayres, 2005). Resource extraction 
(mining, oil drilling and other activities) seriously affects water 
quality, soils and forests (for example, mountain top removal for 
Under increasing pressure from international non-
governmental organizations (ngos), local communities 
that are becoming aware of their ancestral rights over 
natural resources, and other parts of domestic civil 
society, governments in the resource-rich South are 
finally starting to implement policies aimed at limiting 
some of the large environmental costs that commodity 
extraction entails. More countries are now enforcing 
environmental regulations, albeit very timidly, on the 
use of many ecosystems that tend to be destroyed by 
unscrupulous resource extraction.6 In other words, 
coal extraction). The United States could significantly increase its 
oil production by expanding off-shore or Alaskan production, at 
the cost of ever higher risk of environmental destruction.
6  Brazil, for example, has passed an environmental crime act with 
stiff sanctions including imprisonment; and ngos frequently lobby 
for the enforcement of laws to protect the Amazon (Da Motta, 
2003). In 1991 Colombia’s constitutional law completely reorganized 
environmental management, resulting in stricter enforcement. 
Priority has been given to the use of economic instruments, and 
especially to punitive and compensatory pollution charges or 
taxes (Huber, Ruitenbeck and da Motta, 1998). More recently, 
China, Taiwan Province of China, and Korea have implemented 
FIGURE 7
india and China: wheat consumption and share in 
total world consumption, by period
(Percentages and thousands of metric tonnes) 
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the countries of the South have started doing what 
the few natural resource-rich countries in the North 
(the United States, Australia and Canada) did several 
decades ago —impose heavy restrictions on resource 
extraction to mitigate the damage caused to fragile 
ecosystems and other renewable natural resources. 
These restrictions ultimately make commodity 
extraction more costly. 
This means that now, perhaps for the first time 
ever, the long-run supply curve of natural-resource-
based commodities has become relatively inelastic. 
The finite capacity of  the natural world is finally 
being reflected in an increasingly vertical commodity 
supply curve. Ironically this is due not so much to the 
scarcity of non-renewable underground materials but 
mainly to the increasing degradation of ecosystems 
and other renewable natural resources that are crucial 
to life, resulting from the massive exploitation of 
non-renewable resources. 
In short, economic growth is now shifting the 
world commodity demand curve upwards more rapidly 
at a time when the long-run commodity supply curve 
has become relatively inelastic. Hence, it appears that 
world economic growth and commodity prices are 
now more intimately related than in earlier decades. 
This may explain the large hike in commodity 
prices that took place in 2003-2007 and, as shown 
below, helped trigger the current recession. Since the 
increased sensitivity of commodity prices to economic 
growth is symmetric, it also explains the rapid fall 
in commodity prices in the depths of the crisis and 
their rapid recovery in the second half  of 2009 and 
2010, when world economic growth began to stage 
a tentative recovery. 
Climate change
The capacity of the atmosphere to absorb greenhouse 
gases without major climatic disturbance is another 
prominent example of how renewable resources act 
as a constraint on the expansion of commodity- and 
raw-materials-based industries. Once environmental 
policies incorporate the costs of climate change, this 
will eventually have to be reflected in higher prices for 
these products. The emergence of the new industrial 
giants and ever-increasing demand for material goods 
policies that are broadly in line with international standards for 
targeting and reducing greenhouse gases (Shapiro, 2009). Engel and 
López (2008) provide a detailed account of how organized local 
communities have recently emerged around the world to uphold 
their rights and restrict access to natural resources.
by consumers in the North have kept greenhouse-
gas emissions at high levels, resulting in increasing 
concentrations of such gases in the upper atmosphere 
(Bohringer and Loschel, 2003; Loschel and Zhang, 
2002). At the same time, the scientific evidence shows 
that an impending climate disaster can only be avoided 
if  greenhouse-gas emissions are drastically cut. The 
demands made on the atmosphere have for too long 
outweighed its capacity for self-renewal, leading to 
an accumulation of  climate-changing gases with 
the potential to cause major setbacks for human 
development.
The nigs are responsible for a growing share of 
total global emissions, which had surpassed 25% in 
2006 (see figure 8). More importantly, the elasticity 
of  emissions with respect to economic growth in 
the nigs is very high, because production in those 
countries makes intensive use of fossil fuels, including 
oil, natural gas and coal. This means that continued 
economic growth in those countries will entail a large 
increase in their emissions. 
Global economic growth is thus even more closely 
tied to carbon emissions than it was during the late 
twentieth century; and even merely stabilizing world 
emissions at their current unsustainable levels will 
require much more intensive and costly efforts by the 
North to compensate for increasing emissions from 
the nigs. Reducing the magnitude of climate change 
constitutes a new constraint on economic growth that 
has been largely ignored over the last few decades. In 
other words, an important yet hitherto ignored limit 
to growth in the North has been aggravated by the 
rise of the nigs as powerhouses of global economic 
growth and by the constantly expanding consumption 
of material goods in the North.. 
The Kyoto Protocol of  the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, originally 
envisaged as a mechanism to deal with the growing 
emissions of  climate-changing gases, has thus far 
proven ineffective owing to a lack of commitment 
by the largest carbon emitters, such as the United 
States, China, India and other major economies. 
Notwithstanding the, hitherto mostly failed, attempts 
to develop an international institution that is effective 
in limiting carbon emissions, sooner or later the world’s 
economies will have to recognize this constraint; but 
imposing heavy restrictions on carbon emissions 
would imply new constraints on the growth of the 
nigs and could even threaten their role as large-scale 
providers of  (highly carbon-intensive) industrial 
goods to the North. 
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1. The North “sets its economy free” from the 
“shackles of government”
By the early 1980s the North had embarked upon 
its own “structural-change” process. The view that 
the “omnipotent state” and excessively high taxes 
were suffocating the private economy became widely 
accepted among policy-makers and economists; and 
the belief  was that tackling these issues would make 
it possible to increase economic efficiency and thus 
allow for faster economic growth. Most countries 
in the North embarked on a far-reaching policy 
experiment that was justified as a means to enhance 
market incentives for investment and innovation. 
The new structural-change policies included 
several pro-market measures, together with a massive 
withdrawal of government from the economy. The 
process included large tax cuts and fiscal retrenchment 
affecting a broad spectrum of  social spending, 
together with large-scale financial deregulation. Even 
more important than the financial deregulation, 
however, was a process of “de-supervision” involving 
deliberate government actions to weaken the powers 
of the regulatory agencies by cutting their budgets, 
staffing, and powers (Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Kane, 2008). Moreover, structural change, especially 
in the United States and other advanced countries, 
also included policies and legislation (some subtle and 
others less so) aimed at weakening labour unions; and 
successive governments allowed the real minimum 
wage to gradually erode (Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 
2006). These policies significantly weakened workers’ 
bargaining power, which ultimately may have led to 
lower real labour earnings for all except top executives, 
financial traders and a few others. Although some 
of these policies may have encouraged investments, 
especially financial ones, they also appear to have 
had a number of serious, yet presumably unintended, 
consequences for wealth distribution. 
Against a backdrop of increasing globalization, 
and in some cases under pressure from international 
financial institutions (ifis), these policies in the North 
IV
The new economic policies 
FIGURE 8
China and india: carbon dioxide (CO2)emissions from the consumption 
and burning of fossil fuels 
(Millions of metric tons)
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were imitated by governments in many countries of 
the South. Indeed the same ideological consensus 
that led the North to adopt such radical reforms took 
root among most policy-makers and economists in 
developing countries. Of course, this extreme ideology 
of more market and less government (and less taxation) 
was partly created and supported by institutions 
directly or indirectly funded by élite groups, including 
think-tanks, universities and most of the media. The 
ever greater ideological influence gained by the élites 
through these institutions has been replicated in many 
countries in the South and has become their main and 
most effective lobbying mechanism. This paved the 
way for ifis to serve as vehicles for instituting similar 
policy reforms in developing countries. Policy-makers 
in developing countries, many of whom had received 
their academic training in United States universities, 
did not need much persuasion —particularly since 
following ifi advice would significantly improve 
access to international credit and other types of 
international support. 
2. The state does not regulate… wealth 
becomes more concentrated
These policies, which were intended to increase 
economic efficiency and maintain economic growth 
in the North, may also have been partly responsible 
for the massive concentration of  income that has 
occurred over the last two and a half decades.7 While 
7  The rapid conversion of  the economies of  the North towards 
services and away from traditional industrial activities was 
another factor that may have contributed to the erosion of  the 
middle-class and to greater income concentration. A large part 
of  the industrial labour force which had achieved middle-class 
status lost their jobs and suffered significant income losses over 
the adjustment period (this is sometimes referred to as the “lost 
generation”). There are many studies that try to explain the 
concentration of  income by focusing mainly on the distribution 
of  wages among broad groups within the labour force (Autor, 
Katz and Kearney, 2006; Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003; Card 
and di Nardo, 2002). Many of  these emphasize the implications 
for the wage distribution of  new technologies and higher levels 
of  human capital. A study by Gordon and Dew-Becker (2007) 
analyses the consequences for wage polarization of the decreasing 
unionization of  the labour force —a process that has accelerated 
precisely since the time of  structural change. Few studies have 
analysed the upper end of  the wage distribution, in which a high 
portion of  wage incomes seems to have become concentrated. 
Kaplan and Rauh (2009) do this by showing that the amazing 
pay increases received by executives of  investment banks, hedge 
fund, private equity and mutual fund managers and traders, as 
well as other categories of  top executives in large corporations, 
largely explain the observed polarization of  wage income. This 
increase in executive pay, benefiting perhaps no more than 
1% of  the labour force, is mainly due to the extreme financial 
not necessarily the sole cause of  growing inequality, 
the evidence suggests that these policies contributed 
significantly to the trend (Sloan, 1997). Figures 9 
and 10 give an idea of  the massive concentration of 
income that has taken place in the United States and 
United Kingdom, respectively, especially since the 
early 1980s. In the United States, the middle class 
(defined here as the second, third and fourth quintiles 
of  the household income distribution, representing 
about 200 million people) saw its share of  national 
income shrink continuously from nearly 54% in 
1980 to 47% in 2006, while the share of  the poor 
(the lowest 20%) shrank from 5% to 4%. Most of 
these reductions benefited the wealthiest 5% of  the 
population, whose share of national household income 
grew from 17% to 22.5% over the same period (in 
2007 the richest 400 households in the United States, 
with an average annual income of US$ 350 million 
per household, received more than 1.5% national 
income). Similarly in the United Kingdom, the share 
of  the middle class fell from 55% to 50% between 
1980 and 2006, while that of  the poorest quintile 
also dropped from 10% to 8%. Concomitantly, the 
share of  the top 10% of  households grew from 20% 
to 27% of  total household income.
As a result of this concentration of income, the 
average real household income of the middle class in 
the United States has hardly increased over the last 
three decades, rising from US$ 48,000 in the early 
1980s to just US$ 52,000 in 2007 (see figure 11). In 
other words, while annual per capita gdp grew by 
more than 2% in this period, income growth in middle-
class families was about 0.3% per year. In contrast, 
the mean real household income of the wealthiest 
5% of  the population rose dramatically over the 
same period, from US$ 155,000 to US$ 290,000, far 
outpacing per capita gdp. 
3. dilemmas and paradoxes
The new regulatory environment provided incentives for 
business profit that were highly positive for economic 
expansion. Nonetheless, income concentration made 
it harder to match those incentives with the expansion 
of domestic demand needed to sustain such profits 
and fuel economic growth over time. When income 
becomes more concentrated, the middle class —the 
backbone of the consumer economy— is squeezed; and 
deregulation and other structural adjustment policies implemented 
in the early 1908s.
40
GLoBAL EConoMIC CRIsEs, EnVIRonMEntAL-REsouRCE sCARCIty AnD WEALth ConCEntRAtIon  •  RAMón LóPEz
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 2  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 0
FIGURE 9
United States: income distribution: income shares by group, 1967-2005
(Percentages)
FIGURE 10
United Kingdom: income distribution: income shares by group, 1961-2001
(Percentages)
Source: World Income Inequality Database (wiid), United Nations University – World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(unu-wider).
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this makes it much harder to keep domestic demand 
growing at the rates needed to sustain high rates of 
business profits and economic growth. 
The maintenance of  a high rate of  economic 
expansion in the North depends largely on matching 
rates of  consumption growth (Boone, Girouard, 
and Wanner, 2001; McConnell, Mosser, and Perez-
Quiros, 1999).8 A continuous and rapid expansion 
of consumption, in turn, needs a prosperous middle 
class; but middle-class incomes grew by less than 
one eighth of the per capita gdp growth rate. So, in 
principle, the rate of growth of middle-class household 
income was insufficient to support the consumption 
expansion that the economies of the North needed 
to sustain their historical growth rates.9 The dilemma 
8  Another possible source of growth was exports, but given the 
historically low weight of export products in gdp, even rapid export 
expansion cannot provide enough support to domestic growth. 
Investment, at less than 20% of  gdp, is also too small to make a 
significant difference for growth. Moreover, investment is largely 
driven by consumer demand itself.
9  While the phenomenal increase in the after-tax income of the 
wealthy meant that their consumption expanded rapidly, the 
fact that their propensity to consume is far lower than that of 
the middle class means that the net effect on total consumption 
of redistributing income from the middle class to the wealthy is, 
ceteris paribus, negative.
was how to persuade the middle class to expand its 
consumption sufficiently to keep per capita gdp 
growing by 2-2.5% per year, when its real income 
was only growing at 0.3%. 
In these conditions, the required consumption 
growth could only occur if  credit was plentiful and 
cheap, and if  the middle class could be induced to 
accept ever higher debt levels. Why did households 
fall so readily into the temptation of  easy credit? 
The massive inflow of  capital from the nigs and 
oil-exporting countries was one contributory factor; 
and the almost complete financial deregulation and 
de-supervision by government agencies, which fuelled 
the proliferation of exotic and highly risky financial 
instruments, was another. The final ingredient was 
monetary policy. The Federal Reserve implemented 
a generally permissive monetary policy in the face of 
obvious asset-price bubbles; and it also failed in its 
financial regulation function. 
These three factors generated an unprecedented 
flood of credit and other financial resources into the 
consumer economy, thereby creating the conditions 
for the last component of the miracle (or, to be more 
precise, mirage), namely an extraordinary rise in the 
price of assets of all kinds, but particularly real-estate 
and equities, driven by the burgeoning demand for 
FIGURE 11
United States: real family income, by income group, 1967-2007
(Dollars at 2007 prices)
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such assets that was being fuelled by the massive 
and continuous inflow of financial resources into the 
economy. The resulting capital gains made ordinary 
citizens feel wealthier, even though their income 
flows were hardly growing at all —since most of the 
income growth accrued to a very small minority of 
the population. The confusion between (necessarily) 
short-term capital gains and higher permanent income 
induced middle-class families to cut savings and rapidly 
expand their consumption, financed by easy credit 
with inflated assets often used as collateral.
Although the dilemma of sustaining economic 
growth with stagnant middle-class incomes was 
“resolved” through easy credit and low interest rates, 
there were ominous implications. This growth model 
requires ever-rising household debt levels, backed 
by ever-increasing equity and real-estate prices. The 
debt burden of the average household almost tripled 
in two decades, from 45% of  its annual income in 
the mid-1980s to 120% in 2004 (Taylor and others, 
2008). Obviously this could not be considered a 
permanent solution.
4. The monetary and financial regulation 
syndrome: “kicking the can down the road”
Almost two decades of  monetary and financial 
profligacy, driven by increasing income concentration, 
created the conditions for a potential economic tsunami. 
The middle class’ continuing and ever-greater reliance 
on new borrowing to finance a large proportion of its 
consumption, made the consequences of restricting 
monetary policy and tightening financial regulation 
much more costly than previously. In fact, for every 
percentage-point hike in interest rates, median 
household income, after debt service, falls nearly three 
times as fast when the debt/income ratio is 1.2, as it 
is today, than when it is 0.45 as it was in the early 
1980s. Moreover, with middle-class income growing so 
slowly, consumption growth depends almost exclusively 
on new borrowing. Hence, monetary tightening, or 
stricter enforcement of financial regulations to curtail 
the manifestly risky practices of the financial sector, 
have much more depressing effects on consumption. 
Consequently, the effects of financial and monetary 
tightening on the real economy are likely to be much 
more pronounced than previously, when household 
consumption was more closely linked to permanent 
income than to new borrowing.
Awareness of  the serious consequences of 
tightening monetary and financial policies in a heavily 
indebted economy makes the monetary and financial 
authorities more reluctant to respond promptly to 
monetary and financial imbalances; and it may make 
them less likely to implement effective regulations 
even when there are clear signs of serious financial 
“anomalies”, such as prolonged asset bubbles. This 
has helped generate a serious regulatory syndrome, 
namely addiction. The longer the implementation 
of  corrective monetary and financial measures is 
delayed, the greater are the short-run adjustment costs 
of doing so, and hence the greater the incentives for 
policy-makers to “kick the can down the road” to gain 
time and leave the financial and monetary authorities 
of the future to solve the problem. This makes the 
monetary and financial authorities progressively more 
complacent, which fosters even deeper imbalances 
which, by the time the authorities are finally forced 
to adopt the necessary measures, could potentially 
trigger a much more serious crisis. 
V
Commodity prices and inflation: the crisis 
Given the relatively small weight of commodities in 
consumer demand in the North, the sharp commodity-
price hikes associated with the rapid growth of the 
world economy initially had little impact on inflation 
in the North. Nonetheless, the magnitude of  the 
commodity-demand implied by 8-10% annual growth 
rates in the nigs forced their prices relentlessly upwards 
(Bosworth and Collins, 2008). As commodity prices 
skyrocketed in 2003-2007 they started to have an 
effect on the overall consumer price index (cpi) in 
the United States and many other countries, which 
were not always immediately internalized by the 
monetary authorities provided they did not affect 
so-called “core” inflation. However, core inflation 
was eventually affected, and by the end of 2004 the 
cpi had more than doubled. This ultimately forced 
the Federal Reserve to belatedly tighten monetary 
policy, causing a steady rise in the effective Federal 
43
GLoBAL EConoMIC CRIsEs, EnVIRonMEntAL-REsouRCE sCARCIty AnD WEALth ConCEntRAtIon  •  RAMón LóPEz
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 2  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 0
Funds Rate from 1.25% in the last quarter of 2004 
to over 5% by the end of 2007 (see figure 12). 
As economic growth had become so dependent 
on ever-expanding household debt and easy credit, 
which the income-squeezed middle class needed to 
sustain growth, the monetary tightening of  2005-
2007 had much more traumatic consequences than 
previous episodes of this type.10 In fact, it brought 
the economic boom to an end and triggered the start 
of the great global recession. Firstly, the interest-rate 
hike caused a concomitant rise in mortgage rates, 
leading to the sudden collapse of the housing market, 
which —at the peak of a prolonged price bubble— 
was highly sensitive to mortgage rates. With falling 
real-estate values and the consequent evaporation of 
a significant part of earlier capital gains, consumers
10  The financial and real-estate bubble that was fuelled by cheap 
credit was part of the same phenomenon.
suddenly realized that they were not nearly as wealthy 
as they had been led to believe. 
Moreover, the drying up of  credit made it 
increasingly difficult for the middle class to continue 
borrowing; and, more importantly, the cost to 
consumers of servicing their accumulated debt went up 
significantly. The high debt-to-income ratio has made 
consumer incomes highly vulnerable to interest-rate 
hikes, possibly more so than ever before. All of this 
prompted an initial round of adjustment in household 
consumption and caused widespread defaults in the 
housing sector, which, in turn, led to financial collapse 
inflicting capital losses on equity markets. Large-scale 
capital losses meant the evaporation of the collateral 
asset values that underpinned continued borrowing, 
thereby causing a second-round impact on consumption 
which ultimately allowed the crisis to further impact 
the real sector, causing high unemployment. This 
now appears to be inducing a third-round effect on 
middle-class income and consumption levels, which 
we are experiencing today. The subsequent collapse 
FIGURE 12
United States: commodity prices, inflation, and monetary policy, 2001-2009 
Source: United States Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of  St. Louis.
Note: The letter “Q” placed after the year indicates quarter.
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of the world economy also led to a steep fall in world 
commodity demand and prices. 
Policy responses to the crisis
Governments in the North responded to the crisis in 
the following way: (i) a widespread bail-out process 
involving massive transfers of State resources to large 
financial and non-financial corporations; (ii) a drastic 
relaxation of monetary policy bringing short-term 
nominal interest rates to near zero levels, together 
with quantitative monetary easing —whereby the 
central banks have effectively become direct lenders, in 
particular buying medium- and long-term government 
bonds and lending directly to large financial institutions 
on an unprecedented scale; (iii) massive fiscal expansion 
that has created deficits seldom seen in the history of 
the advanced economies. 
The new deficit-financed fiscal spending is expected 
to partly make up for the sharp retrenchment of 
private expenditure and, in the process, stimulate an 
economic recovery that may entice consumers once 
again to revive their pace of consumption. This view 
sees private consumption being stimulated by the 
economic recovery generated by the fiscal expansion 
and by the near-zero interest rates permitted by the 
more expansionary monetary policy. 
Nonetheless, given the obstinate persistence of 
the new dominant ideology that rejects any structural 
change that would shift the tax burden towards the 
wealthy, fiscal deficits effectively imply large new 
financial liabilities for ordinary citizens, which sooner 
or later will have to be paid for through higher taxes 
and/or inflation. In other words, the capital losses 
suffered by consumers as a result of  the real-estate 
and equity-market collapse, are now compounded 
by potential new obligations in the future generated 
by the fiscal deficits and increased public debt. This 
negative wealth effect is likely to become a serious 
impediment to any significant revival of  private 
consumption. As a result, the multiplier effect of 
large but temporary fiscal and monetary stimulus is 
likely to be small, as impoverished middle-income 
households will be wary when increasing their 
spending. Consequently, once the bulk of the various 
temporary fiscal and monetary stimulus measures are 
withdrawn, there is a risk that the world economy 
may slip back into recession. 
Moreover, the generous assistance given by 
governments to financial enterprises and other parts 
of the large corporate sector effectively means a new 
large-scale transfer of  resources from the average 
citizen to the wealthiest segments of society. A second 
“great wealth transfer” may be underway, thus further 
exacerbating one of the key factors making economic 
growth vulnerable to deep crises. The fact that little 
has been done to tighten financial regulation of the 
major financial companies means that “business as 
usual” has been resumed in the financial sector. This 
has resulted in huge profits for that sector and, once 
again, massive bonuses to top financial executives and 
traders; while most workers, and the non-financial 
part of the economy generally, continue to suffer the 
dramatic consequences of the crisis. 
In sum, policy responses to the crisis have been 
dominated by the prevailing pro-élite ideology. Some 
of the structural fundamentals that caused the crisis 
have thus been exacerbated rather than mitigated, 
which means that the world may remain highly 
susceptible to massive crises, and recovery from the 




The confluence of three major factors has made the 
world more vulnerable to deep and long-lasting crises, 
as never before since the Great Depression. One of 
these factors —extreme income inequality both in 
advanced and in many developing countries— is as 
glaring as in the years prior to the 1929 crash. Unlike 
the 1920s, however, the world is now experiencing 
an increasing scarcity of environmental resources, 
which is making commodity supply less responsive 
at a time when the elasticity of the global demand 
for commodities with respect to world growth has 
increased. As a result, economic growth is now more 
closely tied to rising commodity prices than in the 
twentieth century. The combination of greater wealth 
inequality and the concomitant impoverishment 
of the middle class and the high responsiveness of 
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commodity prices to global expansion, have potentially 
lethal economic consequences. 
Although inflation in the advanced economies 
is now less directly affected by commodity prices, the 
persistent rise in commodity prices fuelled by rapid 
world growth eventually feeds into core inflation, 
thereby forcing governments to adopt restrictive 
monetary policies. As a consequence of the highly 
concentrated distribution of wealth, monetary and 
financial tightening now have much more dramatic 
effects on the real sector of the economy than they 
used to have. As a result, the world is now more crisis-
prone, and global economic growth may become much 
more difficult to sustain than in the past. 
In response to the current crisis, the world has seen 
an unprecedented combination of massive bail-outs 
for large firms, together with fiscal stimulus measures 
and extraordinarily lax monetary policies in the 
advanced countries. Public lending has taken up part 
of the slack left by the reduced private lending caused 
by the financial debacle. A new period of easy credit 
seems to have arrived, with the sole difference that the 
source is now public rather than private. Moreover, 
fiscal stimulus has spawned gigantic fiscal deficits, as 
governments have generally been reluctant to raise 
taxes on the rich —apart from a few isolated token 
gestures— to at least partly finance the deficits. While 
probably preventing the great recession from becoming 
a new great depression, the anti-crisis policies seem 
to have done little to address the structural problems 
discussed in this article. Moreover, the bail-out of 
large firms may have exacerbated one of those factors 
by inducing a second-round wealth transfer from the 
middle class to the super-rich.
The crisis brought about a temporary reduction of 
commodity prices and a concomitant fall in inflation. 
Nonetheless, with the structural factors discussed in 
this paper remaining in place, and given the huge fiscal 
and monetary imbalances created in confronting the 
crisis, even the modest recovery of the world economy 
has revived commodity-demand pressures, and the 
prices of several commodities have more than doubled 
over the last eighteen months. If  the global economy 
continues its recovery, commodities may again fuel 
inflationary pressures, which is likely to prompt 
governments to reverse monetary policy and reduce 
fiscal deficits by raising taxes. Furthermore, the large 
fiscal imbalances mean that any economic recovery 
would put additional upward pressure on long-term 
interest rates. Lastly, unless governments are able 
to divorce themselves from the persistent dominant 
economic ideology, the necessary future tax increases 
will almost certainly fall mostly on the middle class, 
thus exacerbating the third structural factor even 
further.11 The net effect of all this is that the incipient 
growth recovery is likely to be suffocated. 
Restoring sustained economic growth requires 
addressing the underlying structural factors: make 
aggregate demand less dependent on easy credit, by 
reversing the concentration of wealth and income; and 
promote rapid, environmentally and commodity-saving 
technological change to make global economic growth 
less commodity- and environmentally-intensive.
The new policies must start from an understanding 
that the economic orthodoxy based on the ideology 
of the élites has failed. Excessive wealth concentration 
needs to be corrected, to enable the middle-class 
incomes to expand again. The major threat of 
looming middle-class tax hikes should be removed 
by drastically raising taxes on the super rich, the only 
group that has benefited and continues to benefit from 
the crisis. The burden of overcoming those huge fiscal 
imbalances must be borne by the wealthy rather than 
the middle class —not merely out of fairness but as a 
prerequisite for sustained economic recovery. Restoring 
fiscal balance by raising taxes on the highest-income 
groups would do much to boost confidence among 
ordinary citizens, enabling them to start expanding 
consumption again, thus increasing the fiscal and 
monetary multipliers and paving the way for a more 
permanent economic recovery.
Would large tax hikes on the super-rich undermine 
economic growth, as the prevailing ideology would 
have us believe? The top marginal income tax rate in 
the United States is currently 35%, compared to 91% 
in the 1950s and early 1960s, for people earning more 
than the equivalent of US$ 2 million per year in 2009 
dollars; and it was above 60% for many years until 
the early 1980s. Yet this did not prevent the United 
States economy from growing rapidly in those decades. 
There are many other examples around the world 
where extremely high marginal tax rates affecting the 
super rich have not impeded rapid growth. 
Many of  the other policies introduced in the 
1980s need to be reversed. The financial sector needs 
to be tightly regulated, and the so-called “Tobin tax”, 
11  As this article was being written, the idea of  a national sales 
tax in the usa was gaining increasing support among economists 
and policy-makers. As is well known, however, such taxes are 
highly regressive and would inflict yet another blow on the 
middle class.
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consisting on a small levy on financial transactions 
should be implemented worldwide. Apart from reducing 
incentives for unproductive financial speculation, 
this could provide a major source of tax revenue that 
could help to correct the alarming fiscal imbalances 
prevailing in most of the advanced economies.
The advanced countries have made significant 
progress in controlling the destruction of environmental 
and natural resources caused by their production 
systems, thanks to the dematerialization of  their 
production and appropriate environmental regulation. 
These policies made it possible to internalize many 
environmental and natural-resource costs generated 
by the productive sector. Nonetheless, the externalities 
concept used was too narrow, since it focused only 
on the domestic environmental effects of  economic 
activity. The fact that much of  the natural-resource 
and environmental destruction taking place worldwide 
is linked to highly material consumption structures 
in the developed economies does not seem to bother 
governments in the North. The North’s failure to 
recognize its consumption as a source of  natural 
resource degradation in the South has exacerbated 
global commodity shortages. An obvious implication 
is that consumption needs to be regulated in the North 
to internalize environmental impacts worldwide and 
not just the domestic environmental impacts in the 
North. This would help the South prevent further 
environmental destruction, which in the long run 
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